Re Reading the Min Heejin Hybe Injunction Decision

On May 30, 2024, the injunction filed by ADOR CEO Min Heejin against Hybe seeking to prohibit the exercise of voting rights was granted. Right after the decision, public opinion quickly converged on a reading that "Min Heejin's betrayal has been recognized as fact." Reading the decision as written, however, that interpretation is not accurate in several places. This article follows the wording of the injunction decision and walks through the structure of the burden of proof, the meaning of the phrase "act of betrayal," the assessment of the KakaoTalk materials, and the trajectory in the main suit.

How the burden of proof shifted in this injunction

The starting point a court reviews to grant an injunction is the existence of the right to be preserved. Generally, in an injunction the applicant must establish the right to be preserved, the need for preservation, urgency, and significant risk.

Two reasons led many lawyers to predict that the injunction was unlikely to be granted.

• Removal of a representative director is the exclusive power of major shareholders: under the Commercial Act, the power to dismiss a representative director through the shareholders' meeting belongs to major shareholders.
• The applicant bears the burden of proving the non-existence of breach of duty: given the nature of an injunction where the hearing is concluded in a single session, it was thought practically impossible for Min Heejin to directly prove she had not breached her duty.

The decision, however, effectively shifted the burden of proof. Citing that proving the existence of a non-existence is practically impossible, and that under the shareholders' agreement Hybe bears a duty - absent special cause - to guarantee Min Heejin's term and exercise voting rights accordingly, the court concluded that Hybe must prove the existence of grounds for breach of duty.

This is a fairly innovative approach in injunction practice. It shifted the general principle that the applicant must prove everything, for practical and reasonable reasons.

First issue in the decision: what "act of betrayal" actually means

The phrase most cited in public opinion was "may amount to an act of betrayal, but." That phrase was widely read as "Min Heejin's betrayal has been recognized." The decision, however, runs differently.

The decision states that "it appears clear" that from around late 2023, Min Heejin, while demanding amendments to the shareholders' agreement, explored methods - together with the vice president and others - of weakening Hybe's control over ADOR and enabling her to control ADOR independently. It then continued:

• On the materials submitted so far, it has not been demonstrated that the actions advanced beyond the exploratory or planning stage to a concrete act of execution.
• Accordingly, such actions may amount to an act of betrayal against ADOR, but it is difficult to view them as a wrongful act in office causing harm to ADOR, or as an act in violation of law.

Here, "act of betrayal" does not mean criminal breach of duty or a violation of law. It is a factual assessment that there was conduct contrary to the relationship of trust. That is precisely why the decision wrote, in the same breath, that it is "difficult to view them as an act in violation of law."

Preparatory conspiracy and commencement of execution, viewed through criminal-law yardsticks

In criminal law, preparatory conspiracy is generally not punishable. It is punishable only where there is a special provision, and case law holds that even for preparatory conspiracy to be punished, there must be an objective external preparatory act that enables or facilitates execution. Mere exploration is not even preparatory conspiracy.

The wording in this decision is "it appears clear that they explored." Only the exploratory stage is "clear." Under our general case law, that stage does not even reach preparatory conspiracy. The reason the decision does not write "no commencement of execution" is more naturally read as "the matter never even reached the stage of assessing breach of duty."

Second issue in the decision: discrimination against NewJeans and the ILLIT concept issue

The decision also addressed the two issues for which Min Heejin had demanded correction.

• The discrimination against NewJeans cannot be readily dismissed as groundless.
• The complaint about Hybe pushing through albums of its other artists likewise cannot be readily dismissed as groundless.
• The concept-imitation issue concerning ILLIT and NewJeans is also partly grounded.

In particular, on concept appropriation and imitation, the court found - based on the representative director's duty of loyalty to ADOR and on the contractual duty under exclusive contracts to guarantee and protect NewJeans's activities - that Min Heejin's complaint was partly legitimate. The decision even suggests that if Min Heejin had known and acquiesced, that conduct could itself constitute a breach of the duty of loyalty and the exclusive contracts.

Third issue in the decision: the KakaoTalk materials and trade secrets

Another key issue was the assessment of the KakaoTalk conversations between Min Heejin and the vice president. Hybe argued that trade secrets had been leaked through these conversations, and the legal community debated whether the Communications Privacy Protection Act had been violated and whether unlawfully collected evidence could be used.

The decision, however, settled the matter from a different angle.

• It is difficult to conclude that the information the creditor (Min Heejin) sent to third parties qualifies as ADOR trade secrets.
• There is also no evidence to confirm any specific economic damage to ADOR caused by such conduct.

In other words, before ever reaching the question of whether the materials were unlawfully collected, the injunction court denied the very status of those materials as trade secrets. As a result, the Communications Privacy Protection Act issues had no separate ground on which to be contested.

Decision summary in a single table

The trajectory in the main suit, a separate arena from the injunction

The "main suit" connected to this injunction does not refer to the main proceedings of the injunction itself. The main suit here points to a separate proceeding contesting the effect of the put option, the call option, and the shareholders' agreement.

The trajectory in the main suit turns on:

• Who breached the shareholders' agreement first.
• Whether the breach was so serious that the contract's purpose could no longer be achieved.
• Whether, as a result, Min Heejin can exercise the put option, or whether Hybe can exercise the call option and pay only the contractually defined amount.

One point deserves emphasis here. If we look only at the evidence surfaced in this injunction, the process by which Hybe obtained Min Heejin's personal KakaoTalk materials and saw them reported in the press may evolve into an issue of invasion of the representative director's privacy and a serious breach of the shareholders' agreement. Constitutional freedom of communication and privacy are among the most strongly protected values, and the legislator's stance of strictly punishing wiretapping and interception reflects that ethos. The acquisition and dissemination of these materials are likely to be litigated separately in the main suit.

What this case shows

As a lawyer, I want to point out two things from this decision.

• The gap between public opinion and the decision: there is a considerable distance between the wording in the decision and the public interpretation. Reading the phrase "may amount to an act of betrayal, but" precisely is what allows one to grasp the substance of the case.
• The weight of the main suit: the grant of an injunction does not equal the conclusion of the main suit. That said, based only on the evidence visible now, more circumstances appear unfavorable to Hybe in the main suit. Unless new evidence emerges, it is difficult to conclude that Hybe has the upper hand there.

Frequently asked questions

Q. The injunction was granted, so will the main suit reach the same conclusion? A. No. The injunction and the main suit are different proceedings, and the main suit allows for broader evidence-taking. That said, the facts and assessment surfaced in the injunction decision typically exert some influence on the trajectory in the main suit.

Q. Can Hybe re-use the KakaoTalk materials in the main suit? A. The main suit takes a wider variety of evidence into account, but because the trade-secret status was denied in this injunction decision, the use of those materials will require additional proof. Issues of unlawfully collected evidence under the Communications Privacy Protection Act are also likely to be contested more vigorously in the main suit.

Q. How do put and call options in a shareholders' agreement work? A. Generally, shareholders' agreements provide that, upon certain breach events, one party may exercise a put option to sell to the other at a defined price, or conversely a call option to buy out the other party's stake at a defined price. This case unfolds in the main suit as a contest in which the two sides each consider exercising different options.

What this decision teaches a general reader

The case ultimately demonstrates the value of reading the decision itself. Rather than the categorical phrases that public opinion forms quickly, a precise reading of each word of the decision is closer to the substance of the case. We hope this article serves as one reference point for reading decisions.

If you would like a brief check on this matter or a similar injunction or shareholders' agreement dispute, you can also start a chat consultation now.

Roh Jongeon, Managing Partner / Jonjae Law Firm Family and Inheritance Counsel Team Last reviewed 2026-05-30

This article provides general legal information and does not substitute for legal advice on a specific case. Outcomes vary with the facts, so we recommend a separate consultation for any concrete dispute.